

IN A MATTER BEFORE:

A DISCIPLINARY PANEL OF ENGLAND BOXING

BETWEEN:

ENGLAND BOXING

The national governing body of amateur boxing in England

-and-

TRACY WINDSOR

THE DISCIPLINARY PANEL'S DECISION AND REASONS

Disciplinary Panel

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Representation

Mr. Anthony Sheppard, EB Head of Compliance & Anti-Doping Lead, for England Boxing

Ms. Tracy Windsor, in person

Hearing date: 8th October 2025 (by Zoom)

INTRODUCTION

1. Tracy Windsor (“**TW**”) is and was at all material times in this case an England Boxing (“**EB**”) member, Grade A Judge and Timekeeper and Grade C Referee, who was affiliated to Wellingborough Amateur Boxing Club. She appeared in person before the Disciplinary Panel (the “**Panel**”) to answer allegations that she had breached requirements of the EB Code of Conduct, that require members to:

- *respect the rights, dignity and worth of others; and*
- *promote the reputation of the sport and take all possible steps from preventing it from being brought into disrepute.*

Those requirements are listed under the “*Expected minimum standards of conduct*”, at pages 7 and 18-19 of the EB Code of Conduct.

2. The particulars of the allegations were set out in five charges, detailed at §10 below. They related to messages that were sent by TW to others, via digital means, concerning alleged sexual activity – sometimes said to involve the recipients of the messages and other times concerning third parties i.e. non-recipients. Some of those who received the messages, or about whom they spoke, were EB members. Others were not.

3. TW denied the allegations in their entirety and the matter was referred to the Panel for consideration under the ‘Full Disciplinary Procedure’, provided at section 10 of the EB Disciplinary Code. She had been subject to an interim suspension under section 6 of that Code since 21st August 2025, pending the Panel hearing.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

4. [REDACTED]

5. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

6. The Panel was also informed in advance of the hearing that TW wished to call a witness in support of her case and, despite the fact that the witness had not provided a written statement, given that EB did not object to that course the Panel accepted the witness could be called to give live evidence when their turn came, thus ensuring that TW was not prejudiced in any way in presenting her case - if the witness had relevant evidence to give. The Chair observed that if the witness' evidence turned out to be irrelevant (as to which there would be no forewarning, given the lack of a statement), then it would be deemed inadmissible and prevented from continuing – that concern did not persist. That witness' identity is not revealed in this decision, for reasons that shall be explained below, and they shall be referred to as 'witness Y'.
7. Finally, at the start of the hearing, TW complained that she had “not received full disclosure”. When the Chair asked what she meant by that, she said that she would have liked to have seen full statements from those concerned in her messages (as recipients or as named) as to how they felt about the content of the messages i.e. that what TW had said in the messages was true, as those others would have to accept if being truthful, and that they would never have been caused any offence by what she had said to or about them. The Chair explained that how others felt about the content of the messages was not relevant to the Panel's task in assessing, objectively, whether TW's sending them was in breach of the Code of the Conduct. And whether what TW said in the messages was true, or not, there was still a wider question about whether her raising their content in the manner and tone she did would constitute misconduct.
8. The Panel was therefore not tasked with determining the truth or falsity of the underlying claims in the messages and did not do so. And so, as shall be seen, the Panel did not come to any decision against TW on the basis that the assertions she made in her messages were false. In fact, having heard the evidence, it considered the case on the basis that TW at least held a genuine belief in the truth of the matters to which her messages related, which was of course favourable to her.
9. Those matters above having been dealt with, neither EB nor TW (hereafter, each a “**Party**”, or together “**Parties**”) raised any other issues as to the procedural regularity of these proceedings under the Disciplinary Code and the Panel considered the case accordingly.

THE CHARGES

10. The particulars of the charges against TW, by which EB said she had breached the Code of Conduct as at §1 above, were in the following terms:

“1. From 15 August 2025 you contacted [REDACTED] via Facebook, alleging [REDACTED]”

2. Within the Facebook messages you state you have had to sign a Non Disclosure Agreement (NDA) as you are an EB Official.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

4. On 05 August 2025 you sent a WhatsApp message to [REDACTED] alleging [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

5. On 05 August 2025 you sent the same WhatsApp message to [REDACTED] alleging [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]”

(Each a “charge (1-5)”, or together, the “charges”).

11. The Panel has used square brackets above, to anonymise individuals whose names had been given in full at those points in the charges, as well as elsewhere in the evidence, which the Panel assumes was in error given their names were reduced to initials elsewhere. The Panel shall refer to them by their initials throughout this decision¹.
12. EB’s case was based purely on TW’s sending of those messages and the nature of their content, which is self-evident from their being recited in the charges above. No further background is therefore required at this stage, although the context in which they were sent it set out further below.

APPLICABLE RULES AND REGULATIONS

13. Given her position within EB, as detailed at §1 above, there was no dispute that at all material times, TW was subject to the obligations imposed upon her by the Code of Conduct and was subject to the jurisdiction of the EB Disciplinary Code and this Panel.
14. In those circumstances and in the interests of brevity, the Panel does not consider it necessary to rehearse any applicable sections of the Code of Conduct or Disciplinary Code in writing at this point. Both are publicly available, the terms of the Code of Conduct allegedly breached are set out at §1 above, and both codes shall be referred to further below, where relevant.
15. TW did raise an issue in response to the charges, to the effect that her alleged misconduct (the facts of which she would accept) did not fall within the proper ambit of the Code of Conduct and/or amount to a breach of that Code in any event, as she asserted it concerned

¹ This will ensure that EB’s intention that the individuals remain anonymous is achieved, should this decision be published. TW did not object to their anonymisation. She was aware of their identities and their full names were used at the hearing, so she did not suffer any prejudice in challenging EB’s case or presenting her own. The Panel notes that EB might consider applying some other form of anonymisation, given the individuals concerned will likely be easily identified by reference to their initials, particularly in the context of this case.

private conduct, not regulated by EB. That would be a substantive defence in response to the charges and is a different to the question of EB's jurisdiction, as at §13 above. It is considered in further detail below.

EVIDENCE RECEIVED

16. Prior to the hearing, the Panel received EB's nineteen-page PDF file entitled, '*TWPanelPack_Redacted*', which comprised EB's case (the "**EB papers**"), and a file entitled '*Appendix7-TWResponseToPanel*', which followed numerically from the appendices in the EB papers but stood alone as TW's "**Written Response**" to the charges, by way of an email she had sent to EB on 30th September 2025. Earlier emails from TW to EB, responding to matters raised by EB in its investigation into her conduct, were also available to the Panel in the EB papers. All such documentation was considered in full, in addition to the oral evidence and submissions heard from the Parties at the hearing, and the Panel refers in this decision only to the evidence and submission required to explain its decisions on the matters before it.

BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF

17. EB bore the burden of proving the charges on the balance of probabilities. With each charge to be considered separately by the Panel, albeit within the factual matrix of this case.
18. Accordingly, the Panel must be satisfied that, on the evidence, the occurrence of an alleged event was more likely than not. It must also be satisfied to the same standard that any admitted, or proven act or omission would fall subject to the requirements of the Code of Conduct and, where so, amount to a violation of that Code, pursuant to which the charges against TW were brought – taking account of any applicable defence she might raise in response.
19. EB would therefore also have the burden of disproving any defence raised by TW (whether as to her alleged acts and/or whether they were within the ambit of, and breached the Code of Conduct), also on the balance of probabilities, so as to make out a charge.

THE HEARING

20. Having introduced and explained the hearing process to the Parties, the Panel Chair offered TW the opportunity to hear how the Panel was likely to approach its consideration of each charge, if that might help her to focus on the relevant, disputed issues as the Panel saw them (without limitation of any matters TW might wish to raise), given she was representing herself. TW availed herself of that offer.

21. The Chair explained that in respect of each charge, the Panel would likely consider, first, whether the conduct alleged against her by EB was proved as a matter of fact (if disputed), and then, second, whether it fell within the ambit of, and breached the Code of Conduct.
22. During that dialogue, TW accepted that, as a matter of fact, she had conducted herself as particularised in each charge. The Panel therefore had no issue in determining that those facts were, upon TW's own admission, proved to the requisite standard. As much was to be expected, given the documentary nature of the evidence in the EB papers, being records of the alleged offending messages that, by their content, had clearly been sent by TW. Her Written Response had been framed on that basis, too.
23. As to whether the conduct in each charge fell within the ambit of, and amounted to a breach of the Code of Conduct, considering TW's Written Response the Panel indicated that it would consider matters including, but not limited to, the intended (and reasonably proportionate) reach of the Code of Conduct; whether TW's conduct (i.e. her sending of the messages) was in a public, or wholly private setting; whether the messages were sent to, or concerned EB members (which would not necessarily be decisive of itself, given the public/private consideration above); whether they concerned the functioning of EB and/or its permitted events; and whether or not they were sent by TW whilst acting in a function of, or in connection with, her membership of EB (which, again, would not necessarily be decisive in itself and, it was explained further, any connection between her conduct and EB/its membership could be express, implied, direct or indirect i.e. her sending messages ostensibly through personal lines of email/phone/social media communication did not necessarily mean they were wholly private, or not to do with EB and its membership, or might not fall subject to the terms of the Code of Conduct, even if they were not sent by TW acting in any official EB capacity – as shall be seen, the Code of Conduct's reach clearly extends beyond that).

England Boxing's case

24. In opening and summarising EB's case, Mr. Sheppard explained that whilst TW had used private lines of communication (i.e. not official EB email addresses, phone numbers or social media accounts) to send the messages concerned in the charges, each message went to and/or concerned members of EB, or (in the case of charges 2 and 3) related to the disciplinary function of EB itself.
25. It was those factors, he submitted, as well as TW's true purpose for sending the messages (EB alleged that was to cause distress to others), that put her in breach of the Code of Conduct. The messages were not, on EB's case, sent for altruistic and intendedly private purposes, but to create scandal, damage and offend those to whom they were sent or named, for whatever reason TW felt she had to send them – which was unknown. That, said Mr. Sheppard, was demonstrated by the tone of the messages, considered collectively, even if certain messages viewed in isolation (which he submitted they ought not be) might not give such an impression. Some of the messages, though, he said plainly fell foul of the requirements of the Code of Conduct even in isolation. Mr. Sheppard said that all of the

above would remain so, whether TW believed claims she made in the messages concerned in charges 1, 4 and/or 5 were true or not, and even whether they were actually true or not.

26. EB did not call any live witnesses at the hearing, given that its case was evidenced documentarily and, in the event, TW admitted the facts as stated in the charges i.e. she had sent each of the messages documented in the EB papers, upon which the case was brought in the terms set out by Mr. Sheppard, as above.

TW's Response

27. In response, giving evidence in her own case, TW said that the starting point for her actions as charged was that [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

28. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

29. Matters developed from there, TW said, through the sequence of messages (referring to them collectively, by whatever means they were sent and whether at TW's instigation, or in reply to others) as were now detailed in the charges. They are set out fully in the EB papers and need not be set out in full here.

30. It should be added at this stage that [REDACTED] to whom the messages in charges 1 and 2 related, was not an EB member, although as mentioned above, [REDACTED] to whom they related, was. And the message in charge 3 was sent by TW directly to EB, in response

² There was a question as to whether messages relating to PR (TW's husband, as named in charge 4) were sent at a time when he was an EB member, given he was suspended at some stage, as mentioned at §5 above. In any event, none of the Panel's decisions on the charges turned on the question of his membership status, as all the messages concerned in the charges were sent to, or concerned other EB members in any event, and so PR's status need not be considered further.

to its enquiries as to why TW had sent the messages in charges 1, 2, 4, and 5, including suggesting (as in charge 2) that she was subject to a non-disclosure agreement (“NDA”) that prevented her from revealing any more information about the claims she had made in her messages with [REDACTED] (as in charge 1), when he asked for it.

Alleged sexual impropriety

31. The Panel repeats that its task was not to – and this decision does not – determine whether the claims made by TW about others were, or might have been true and accurate, or not. The hearing would not, therefore, simply become a forum for TW to ventilate those claims.

32. On the other hand, TW’s state of mind (i.e. whether she genuinely believed the claims to be true) was potentially relevant to the Panel’s considerations vis-à-vis her liability (or not) for the charges and extent of any wrongdoing, especially with regard to charges 1, 4 and 5. Because if TW did not believe the matters she alleged in the messages in those charges were true, or, worse, knew that they were not, or that they did not truly concern her, as being related to [REDACTED] it would follow that the messages could only ever have been sent for some malicious reason, based on falsity.

33. If TW had sent the messages on that basis, her claim that she had intended them to remain private between her and the recipients, with a view to nothing more than getting to the bottom of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] as described at §§27-29 above, would have been wholly undermined. The Panel would have had no hesitation in concluding, in those circumstances, that TW’s sending of such messages to or about EB members, as each message in charges 1, 4 and 5 were, breached the Code of Conduct, as would her efforts to retract and cover up such misconduct by the messages in charges 2 and 3.

34. [REDACTED]

35. The Panel would consider the case on that basis, as it indicated to TW, especially in circumstances where the issue of whether her beliefs were accurate (which the Panel notes they might not have been, even if reasonably held) was not being litigated (albeit those concerned had denied the claims in writing). It would have been wholly unfair to TW, in circumstances where that issue was not being litigated, for the Panel to have simply

concluded that her claims were not true and accurate and then considered/decided the case against her, on the basis postulated at §33 above, as if their not being true and accurate meant that her belief in them could not have been genuinely and reasonably held nonetheless – which is a different, mutually exclusive matter.

Charges 1, 4 & 5

36. When reflecting on the manner and tone in which the messages in charges 1, 4 and 5 were sent (chronologically, they are better viewed in the order of charge 4, then 5, then 1, as explained in context above), and what followed in as in charges 2, then 3, TW said that she had not intended to set off on a course that would see her send a stream of messages of the type now seen in the EB papers.
37. In respect of charges 4 and 5, TW said that having reflected, she was sorry for the messages to ██████ having developed as they had and raising wider matters with ██████ in that way ██████ ██████ but that she felt a genuine need to at the time and, due to emotional distress and anger that had built up since ██████ ██████ she was perhaps thinking less clearly than usual in sending the messages about which EB complained.
38. She also expressed sorrow at having sought out, ‘friend requested’ and messaged ██████ about ██████ via social media, as in charge 1. She said that she thought that ██████ likely already know about this matter in any event, but if he did not, he should, and that he might help address the situation from ██████ side. But, whilst insisting she had every right to raise these issues with the people concerned, she acknowledged that the means and tone by which she did so was most probably not appropriate, upon reflection, and would have adversely affected the private, family life of others, particularly other EB members for present purposes.

Charge 2

39. TW confirmed that in her communications with ██████ she had told him that she could not give him further details about the matters that she had revealed to him, which he naturally sought, because she had entered an NDA with EB as part of disciplinary proceedings connected to them. TW also confirmed that that assertion was false – she had never entered, or even been asked to enter into, an NDA with/by EB concerning such matters. This was the subject matter of charge 2.
40. She apologised to EB and the Panel for having said this, explaining that she had done so out of a degree of panic, when ██████ began asking for more information about the matters she had raised in her messages with him. She thought it would put a stop to ██████ asking for more details and extricate her from the situation she had got herself into, having already exchanged messages with him of the type seen in the EB papers.

Charge 3

41. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

47. [Redacted]

[REDACTED]

■ [REDACTED]

Witness “Y”

49. Witness Y gave evidence both as to TW’s character and matters that were relevant to her response to charge.

50. [REDACTED]

■ [REDACTED]

■ [REDACTED]

■ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The Panel’s considerations

- 56. Charges 1, 2, 4 and 5 were left to consider and the Panel had noted that in expressing her apologies and sorrow for having sent the messages in charges 1, 4 and 5, TW had said that she had never intended the messaging to go as far as it did, so as to become offensive (as some of the messages clearly were; they can be seen in the EB papers and need not be rehearsed here), but that her emotions got the better of her. If she saw the individuals concerned again, she said, she would act professionally towards them in accordance with her duties to EB, even if she feels hurt by them. But at the time, she had been, “*a woman scorned and hurt*”, and acted totally out of character. She said she regretted sending the messages.

- 57. Given those sentiments, the Panel asked TW to explain how and why she maintained that her actions had not been in violation of the Code of Conduct, bearing in mind its requirements, even if one could sympathise with her emotional state at the time. As the Panel noted, whatever emotions one might feel (even if justified) and however others might judge their resultant conduct in day-to-day life, the Code of Conduct imposed higher standards to be required of EB members than members of the general public.

- 58. The Panel acknowledged that the emotional distress TW was undoubtedly suffering at the time – and remained obvious now – likely resulted in her judgement failing and her sending messages she would not otherwise, as was supported by the evidence of witness Y, but observed that the extent of her regret at having sent them, even in that state at the time (which even she was not asserting justified them now), suggested that they ought not have been sent. Having reflected, TW accepted that observation; she sought now only to explain, rather than justify the sending of the messages in charges 1, 4 and 5.

59. But, for reasons given in her Written Response to charge, she maintained that her sending the messages was still not in breach of the EB Code of Conduct, because of (i) a “lack of nexus” between her actions and “*EB official duties*”, (ii) her actions, as might otherwise amount to a breach of the Code of Conduct, not having been conducted in an “*EB official capacity*”, and (iii) EB’s jurisdiction “*not extending to private disputes*”. In short, she said, her conduct was not to do with EB, such that the charges should be dismissed and her interim suspension lifted.
60. TW’s suggestion that her conduct was not to do with EB was put to Mr. Sheppard by the Panel, in giving him the chance to respond to her case. The Panel questioned how an individual, who would be well entitled in everyday life to make enquiries of others and even raise issue with them, [REDACTED] would go about such matters in the event that each of them was an EB member – that might always be alleged as a breach of the EB code (bearing in mind that when EB brought this case, it considered TW’s messaging might have been nothing more than vindictive rumour mongering, motivated by a desire to harm others and not based on any truths, but on the evidence the Panel heard, as was indicated to Mr. Sheppard, TW appeared to hold a genuine belief as to the [REDACTED] she said had occurred).
61. In response, Mr. Sheppard acknowledged that if the messages had gone no further than amounting to enquiries or reasonably worded complaints about those matters, or had some altruistic intent as TW suggested at times (particularly with regard to her messaging [REDACTED]), then it might be well be argued that they did not breach the Code of Conduct. EB would not raise charges in such circumstances or, if it did, a Panel such as this would have to consider whether the Code of Conduct was breached, analysing the evidence on a case by case basis.
62. But TW’s messages and her course of conduct as concerned in this case, Mr Sheppard said, clearly crossed the line so as to breach the Code when considered in the round – even if some of her messages, taken in isolation, might not have. Overall, they dealt with the matters at hand improperly, became gratuitously offensive and all concerned, in one way or the other, EB members as their recipients or their subjects (and even then, the recipient was personally connected to the EB member, as [REDACTED], with the obvious intent that the messages should get back to her).
63. The Code of Conduct states, *inter alia*, at page 4:

“The England Boxing (EB) Code of Conduct exists to protect everyone within the sport of boxing and outlines the behaviour expected from all people within the boxing community in England.”

“However you are involved in our sport you have the right to enjoy it and to be protected from the poor conduct of others.”

“If you’re involved at any level of the sport, from community club to Olympic level, this code applies to you.”

At page 6:

“There is a generic element within the Code of Conduct which relates to everyone within the sport. If you have a voluntary or paid role, or you participate in a role which does not refer to you specifically, then the generic Code of Conduct applies to you.”

And at page 7, under the title “*Expected Minimum Standards of Conduct*” (a phrase defined at page 5):

“All individuals involved in boxing in England³ will, at all times:

...

Respect for the rights, dignity and worth of others⁴.

...

Promote the reputation of the sport and take all possible steps to prevent⁵ it from being brought into disrepute.”

[Emphasis added]

64. And sections 5.2 and 5.3 of the Disciplinary Code mandate as follows:

*“5.2 Participants are required to ensure their behaviour is appropriate **at all times** and they may be subject to a charge under this code where such behaviour falls below the standards outlined in the rules, policies, codes, procedures or guidelines, **irrespective of whether that misconduct was committed during participation in EB activity.**”*

*“5.3 A participant is **always required to act in the best interests of England Boxing** and shall not act, at the sole determination of EB, in any way that brings the sport into disrepute.”*

65. The Panel therefore saw force in EB’s submissions as at §§61-62 above. Whilst EB’s jurisdiction does not extend to the subject matter or resolution of private disputes, even between members, its Code of Conduct governs how members should conduct themselves generally and (as would be sufficient for present purposes) certainly with regard to other members and EB activity. As is clear from that part quoted at §1 above, it requires that whatever disagreements members might have between themselves, under its auspices they must still *respect the rights, dignity and worth of others, promote the reputation of the sport and take all possible steps from preventing it from being brought into disrepute.*

³ Notably, not merely *whilst involved/engaged in EB boxing activity.*

⁴ Not only *EB members*, although in this case the Panel found there was sufficient nexus between TW’s conduct and EB member(s) in each charge that he conduct fell within the reach of the Code of Conduct in any event.

⁵ As opposed *not bring it...*

66. In each of charges 1, 4 and 5, the messages were sent to and/or concerned allegations about other EB members that the recipients would have received out of the blue, which would have been unwanted, in parts offensive and, insofar as allegations were made about EB members, those allegations were not accepted and would have had effects that would be in breach of those terms of the Code the Conduct as quoted. Moreover, they made express, direct connections between TW's claims and EB events, and consequences for its administration, as if to scandalise EB operations by reference to the sexual impropriety TW claimed had gone on. That was a plain breach of the Code of Conduct, in the Panel's view.
67. Having heard EB's final position, the Chair invited closing submissions from TW and indicated that amongst anything else she might want to address, she should address the question of why her conduct in charges 1, 4 and 5 did not breach the terms of the Code of Conduct, bearing in mind that if she accepted (as she had) that she ought not have done as stated in each charge, in the manner she did, her having done so merely via private channels of messaging seemed unlikely to extricate her from the application of the Code of Conduct on the facts of the case, for the reasons given at §§65-66 above.
68. In response, to her credit, she acknowledged that she had not previously thought about the Code of Conduct applying more widely than only in respect of her conduct whilst engaged with official EB activity. She said that putting Mr. Sheppard's submissions as to the nature of her messages in those charges in the context of the Chair's observations as to the terms and apparent applicability of the Code, she "could see" why it might be that her conduct would raise issues under that Code.
69. And in respect of charge 2, TW was forthcoming in accepting that, as per EB's submissions, regardless of her reasons for saying she had been subject to an NDA with EB and her emotional state at the time she did so, she had still misrepresented to ██████ that she had been made subject of an NDA by the very organisation of which she was a member and of whose Code of Conduct she was alleged to have breached by that misrepresentation. If that misrepresentation – which had no foundation in reality – were not problematic enough vis-à-vis the Code, it also implied to another person (and for this purpose it wouldn't matter whether they were an EB member or not) that EB had made a member subject to an NDA in a bid to prevent them from speaking about EB-related disciplinary matters, which would give a misleading impression as to the nature and transparency of its disciplinary process.

Decision as to Liability

70. The Panel deliberated privately, to come to its decision upon each charge in the absence of the Parties.
71. TW did not formally admit charges 1, 2, 4 or 5 and maintained that her alleged offending conduct fell outside the ambit of the Code of Conduct, whatever view the Panel might take of it in substance, but for the reasons set out above, which she nonetheless effectively

came to accept by the time of her closing submissions, the Panel disagreed with that last remaining line of defence in her response to charge.

72. The Panel was therefore satisfied upon the balance of probabilities that the conduct as alleged in charges 1, 2, 4 and 5 occurred, fell within the ambit of the Code of Conduct to which TW was subject at the time, and breached both requirements of that Code as set out at §1 above (the conduct in charges 1, 4 and 5 breaching both of the requirements bulleted at §1, given the impact of that conduct upon other members and its potential to bring the sport into disrepute; and the conduct in charge 2 breaching the second bulleted requirement, as having the potential to bring the sport into disrepute for reasons given at §69, such that TW had not acted to “prevent” but had in some senses promoted the risk of it being brought into disrepute, if it had not been already in █████ eyes).

Sanction

73. The Panel informed Parties of its decisions as above (in summary) and invited them to make submissions as to the appropriate nature and degree of sanction. TW was permitted to present any further evidence or submissions she wished in mitigation.
74. The Panel’s sanction options as set out at section 11 of the Disciplinary Code were explained to the Parties.
75. Mr. Sheppard submitted that whilst there are no generally applicable sanctioning guidelines (which does make the assessment of such conduct difficult, as compared against other cases that might be brought), this case had been brought before the Panel on the basis that EB considered it was too serious to be dealt with under the Summary Procedure in section 9 of the Disciplinary Code – the maximum sanctions under which are a suspension for a period not exceeding 28 days; a fine not exceeding £250; education or training; a suspended penalty where, if the terms of the suspended penalty are breached, a suspension of no more than 28 days would be applied; or a combination of any of those before.
76. He submitted that the offending conduct was such that in EB’s view, TW should remain subject to a fixed-term bar (as in section 11.1(a) of the Disciplinary Code) i.e. a suspension for some further period beyond the hearing date, even taking into account the time for which she had been subject to interim suspension, as the Panel was permitted per section 11.2 of the Code. But the period of suspension “should not be measured in years”, he said. He did not contend for any fine or costs order to be made against TW and did not contend that any specific education or training was required on her part, taking account of her own reflection upon her conduct at the hearing.
77. The Panel enquired as to whether a suspension more limited in its scope might be applied, of the types envisaged in sections 11.1(c) and/or (d) of the Disciplinary Code i.e. applying to specific activities only, but Mr. Sheppard submitted that permitting TW to participate in

any EB activity whilst subject to suspension, in the circumstances of this case and given TW's roles in boxing, would render the suspension lenient and largely ineffective.

78. TW submitted that she had already been subject to interim suspension for a period of time such that she considered it sufficient penalty in terms of suspension from all EB activity, but acknowledged the Panel's need to perhaps impose some penalty more and invited it to consider alternatives to a fixed-term bar; including her possibly being suspended from certain EB activities, but now permitted to engage in others. On that point, however, the Panel saw some force in Mr. Sheppard's submissions.

79. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] She had reacted emotionally to the situation in which she found herself and, as she had already told the Panel, her emotions continued to get the better of her, building such that her actions went beyond anything she had intended and were completely out of character for her. She assured the Panel that she was now dealing with the difficulties she had encountered in an appropriate way and hoped to return to EB activity displaying a professional approach to her roles, as she always had before this episode. TW's mitigation was supported by witness Y's evidence, as at §51 above, which had impressed the Panel and it bore strongly in mind.

80. The Panel considered that given the course of conduct in which TW engaged had concerned a number of other members and those close to them, violating their privacy by inappropriate means and sometimes in offensive tone, which would have caused them alarm, and that having set off the chain of events she had (particularly in messaging [REDACTED]) she had then lied about being subject to an NDA at EB's prerogative when in fact she was not, her actions represented multiple, serious breaches of the Code of Conduct so as to merit a fixed-term bar (suspension) from all EB activity. As per Mr. Sheppard's submissions, the Panel did not consider that any additional sanctioning measures would then need be imposed.

81. As to the length of that suspension, the Panel accepted TW's submissions in mitigation, having observed the manner in which she presented and reflected on her misconduct during the hearing, that she was usually a professional EB member and official, who had embarked upon a course of conduct that was out of character and driven by her genuine belief in the matters in relation to which she had set about acting, albeit inappropriately, which had caused her significant emotional distress. She had, it seemed to the Panel, lost sight of the proper means by which she could have dealt with the matters at hand and the error of her approach at the time. The Panel was impressed with her reflection and insight during the hearing, which, whilst not resulting in an admission of any of the charges (that could have seen a discount applied against sanction on that basis alone), demonstrated real contrition on her part, which would be reflected as a mitigating factor against sanction.

82. The Panel considered that the misconduct overall merited imposition of a fixed-term bar until what would conventionally be seen as the end of the current EB boxing 'season', taking

that to be 31st May 2025, with next year's "affiliations day" being on 1st June 2026, also taking into account that TW had already been subject to interim suspension since 21st August 2025. That would amount to a total suspension period of just over 9 months, being not far off the entirety of the current season.

83. In light of the mitigation set out above, however, the Panel considered that of the total period of suspension as would otherwise have been applied (i.e. just over 9 months), the impact of the interim suspension to date and the reflection TW showed during the hearing was such that a large part of what would remain of that suspension could itself be suspended, in accordance with section 11.1(h) of the Disciplinary Code.
84. The Panel considered it appropriate and proportionate that TW should be effectively suspended from all EB activity for period of 4 months from the start date of the interim suspension, with the remainder of the period to 'season end' being suspended. That would mark the gravity of the misconduct overall and serve as some immediate and ongoing punishment, but also recognise TW's mitigation and mean that her assurances that she would not misconduct herself in future could be held against the suspended part of the sanction that would hang over for the remainder of the season.
85. Having again deliberated and come to its decision in private, in the absence of the Parties, the Panel returned to announce its decision on sanction to the Parties as detailed at §87 below.
86. The Parties were informed of their appeal rights and told that whilst the sanction would be effective as of the hearing date, hence it was being announced at the hearing, any timeframes as might apply to appeals would commence from the date of provision to them of this written decision, rather than the hearing date.

THE PANEL'S DECISION

87. For clarity and ease of reference, the Panel therefore decided unanimously that:

As to liability:

- (i) Charges 1, 2, 4 and 5 as brought by EB against TW were proved, upon the balance of probabilities.
- (ii) Charge 3 as brought by EB against TW was not proved.

As to sanction:

- (iii) Taking account of the period for which TW had already been subject of an interim suspension, since 21st August 2025, as permitted by section 11.2 of the Disciplinary Code, TW be subject to a fixed-term bar (suspension) from all EB activity, under

section 11.1(a) of that Code, for a period effective from the date of the hearing up to and including 31st May 2026; BUT

(iv) That fixed-term bar as at (iii) above shall be fully effective up to and including 21st December 2025, after which its remaining period (being from 22nd December 2025 to 31st May 2026, inclusive) shall be suspended in accordance with section 11.1(h) and as permitted by section 11.1(l) of the Disciplinary Code, subject to the single condition that:

a. Should TW admit, or be proved to have committed, any further breach of any EB rule, regulation, code or policy, after the date of the hearing in this matter (i.e. committed after 8th October 2025), before a Disciplinary Panel (or Chair) constituted in accordance with the EB Disciplinary Code on any date up to and including 31st May 2026, the suspended period of the fixed-term bar as at (iv) above shall become immediately effective up to its end date, in addition to any further sanction as such future Disciplinary Panel (or Chair) considers appropriate to impose in respect of any such further breach.

(v) There was no order for costs; and

(vi) No further orders.

88. That sanction shall apply collectively in respect of all the charges found proved. If a sanction need be marked separately against each proven charge, the same sanction (as above) shall be applied to each of them, to run concurrently as across all proven charges, with the totality principle in mind – the Panel having already factored in that there were four breaches of Code of Conduct when arriving at its sanctioning decision.

RIGHT OF APPEAL

89. Parties are reminded of their right to appeal any decision made by the Disciplinary Panel in accordance with section 12 of the EB Disciplinary Code and whilst the above decision was announced at the hearing as being effective as of that date (8th October 2025), any timeframes that apply to appeals brought under the Disciplinary Code, or any other remedy either Party might seek against any aspect of this decision with which they disagree, shall apply as of the date on which such Party was provided with a copy of this written decision.

24th October 2025

Craig Harris (Chair)

Chris Lavey

Jon Dennis